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It is well known that in order to (deterministically) achieve Byzantine agreement (consen-
sus) among n processors in a fully connected network in which f processors may be faulty,
where f satisﬁes f < n/3, exactly f + 1 communication rounds are required. This result was
proved under the assumption that the network topology is known a priori to each processor,
i.e., the identiﬁers of the processors and of the links between processors are known. This
paper deals with the Byzantine agreement problem when such initial setup is not available.
It is shown that f + 1 rounds are sufﬁcient to reach agreement if the faulty processors are
not able to identify themselves with names of the correct processors, and that this upper
bound no longer holds when such identity theft is possible.
© 2009 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
This paper deals with the Byzantine agreement (BA) problem introduced by Pease, Shostak and Lamport in [27,20]. In
this problem, also called the Consensus problem, n processors, each with an input value from a set V (we consider the binary
case V = {0, 1}), need to agree on a common value, despite the presence of f faulty processors (that may behave arbitrarily).
More formally, every correct processor must decide on a value from V , so that the following requirements are satisﬁed: (1)
Termination: every correct processor eventually decides; (2) Agreement: no two correct processors decide differently; (3)
Validity: if the input to all the correct processors is v ∈ V , then v is the decision value. To accomplish this task, the processors
perform several synchronized rounds of message exchange, where in each round a processor is allowed to send a message
to every other processor.
Since its introduction, the BA problem was extensively studied under various timing, topology, authentication and failure
assumptions. In [27,20] and subsequent papers [28,12,4,23,19,18] (just to name a few), it was assumed that the network
topology is known to the processors in advance. This assumption means that every processor has an a priori knowledge of
the true unique identiﬁer of the processor to which it is connected by each one of its n − 1 communication channels (see
Fig. 1a). In this paper, we study the case in which such an a priori setup is not available (see Fig. 1b).
There are several reasons to study this problem. First, while it is reasonable to assume that the topology is known in advance,
this is not necessarily always true. For example, in a newly assembled system, the processors may not know each other’s iden-
tiﬁers. From the theoretical viewpoint, the considered relaxation of the standard BA provides a better understanding of the
minimal requirements necessary to solve the BA problem, and extends the class of problems that are solved by using it.
1.1. Related work
The BA problem has a closely related variant, named Interactive Consistency (IC). In this version of the problem, instead
of agreeing on a single value, the processors have to agree on a vector of values, which has an entry corresponding to every
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Fig. 1. A system with 4 processors, (a) in the standard model (b) without topology information.
processor in the system. The output vectors of any two correct processors must be equal. Furthermore, an entry in the vector
that corresponds to a correct processor has to be equal to the input value of that processor. Clearly, an IC algorithm also solves
the BA problem, e.g., by deciding on the majority value in the output vector.
An (f + 1)-round BA algorithm (which is actually an IC algorithm) for n > 3f and a proof which shows that the BA
problem cannot be solved if n ≤ 3f , was presented in [27,20] (see also [18]). In [4], this algorithm was presented in a more
convenient form, using the EIG-tree data structure. It was also shown that no deterministic algorithm can solve the problem
in less than f + 1 rounds [17]. Later it was shown that the f + 1 round lower bound holds even in the case of crash failures
[13] (see also [21]).
The original BA algorithms required computation and communication that are exponential in f , thus leaving the design of
more efﬁcient algorithms as an open problem. The ﬁrst polynomial BA algorithms, running in O(f ) communication rounds,
were presented in Refs. [13,11,28]. Several follow up papers gradually improved the trade-off between the resilience of the
algorithm and its round complexity, until Garay and Moses presented in Ref. [19] a polynomial algorithm that achieves BA
in f + 1 rounds for n > 3f .
The BA problem was also studied in networks that are not completely connected, with the assumption that the network
topology is known to all the processors [10]. More recently, there was some work that considered a setting in which not all
the processors are “acquainted” [7,29]. These papers deal with BA in networks in which a processor is initially aware only of
its neighbors (and their identiﬁers).
Another related topic, initially studied in Ref. [1], is (failure free) computations in networks of anonymous processors.
Functions and relations that are computable in anonymous networks were characterized in follow up papers, e.g., [30,6,5].
In addition to general networks, the special case of ring network was extensively studied [2,3]. A computationally efﬁcient
(but not time optimal) algorithm for BA in a completely connected anonymous network, which is a further relaxation of the
models considered in this paper, was presented in Ref. [26].
1.2. Overview
This paper studies the BA problem when the processors in a fully connected network start without knowing the network
topology. In this case, there are several reasonable models that can be considered. All the models assume that each message
carries the id of the sender, while they vary according to the ways a faulty processor may corrupt this part of the message.
In this paper, we consider the following models:
(M1) A message sent by any processor always includes its unique true id. In this case, a faulty processor can prevent
a correct processor p from directly learning about its id if and only if it sends no messages to p throughout the whole BA
protocol.
(M2) A faulty processor may send messages with different ids, not necessarily its own. However, it cannot use an id
belonging to a correct processor. Thus, in a precise sense, “identity theft” is not allowed in this model.
(M3) A faulty processor may include any ids in its messages, even those of correct processors, i.e., it is able to “fake”
messages of correct processors.
The most natural approach to develop a BA algorithm for the new models that works in the optimal number of rounds
is to extend the Exponential Information Gathering (EIG) algorithm [4], because the only known algorithms that achieve
the lower bound in the standard model are of this form. Such an extension should build the EIG-tree “on the ﬂy”, in some
consistent manner. Although this approach should work for model M1, it seems that the EIG algorithm cannot be extended
to model M2, for reasons to be explained later. We deal with this problem by looking for an implicit proof for the sufﬁciency
of f + 1 rounds for BA in M2, rather than building an explicit algorithm. To do so, we consider the complex of executions of
the full-information protocol, in which the messages contain the complete information available to their senders so far. Two
executions in the complex are similar, if some correct processor has the same view in both. It is sufﬁcient to show that any
(f + 1)-round execution in which the input of all the correct processors is 0 and any (f + 1)-round execution in which the
input of all the correct processors is 1, belong to two different equivalence classes of the transitive closure of the similarity
relation. To prove this claim, we introduce the notion of similarity-invariant properties, i.e., properties that are preserved by
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the similarity relation. The idea is to prove the (f + 1)-round upper bound on the number of rounds required to reach BA in
model M2 by constructing a similarity-invariant property that holds for any execution in which the input of all the correct
processors is 0, and that does not hold for any execution in which the input of all the correct processors is 1.
Finally, we show that the (f + 1)-round upper bound does not hold for model M3, which allows identity theft. By using a
simple chain argument [16], it is shown that even for f = 1, in the worst case, more than two rounds are required for reaching
BA. This result is also interesting because it gives an example of a model in which consensus in the presence of Byzantine
failures requires more time than in the presence of crash failures.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the notions used in the proof are formally deﬁned. Section 3 demonstrates
the proof technique by showing that f + 1 rounds are sufﬁcient to solve BA in model M1, for a ﬁnite namespace, which
is ﬁxed a priori. Section 4 explains the difﬁculties encountered when trying to extend the EIG algorithm to model M2 and
describes a way for representing the knowledge on execution state which is suitable for this model. Section 5 presents
the proof of the (f + 1)-round upper bound for BA in model M2, for a ﬁnite namespace, which is ﬁxed a priori. Section 6
handles the more complicated case of an inﬁnite unknown namespace. Section 7 deals with model M3. Conclusions and
open questions are given in Section 8.
2. Preliminaries
In this paper, we consider a synchronous system with n processors, in which every pair of the processors is connected by a
direct communication link (channel). To simplify the presentation, we assume that n = 3f + 1. We note that a generalization
of all the results of this paper to the n ≥ 3f + 1 case is straightforward.
Every processor has a unique identiﬁer (name), denoted by α, β , . . . Initially, the correct processors are “unacquainted”
with each other, i.e., there is no initial setup that provides a correct processor with information about the identiﬁers of other
processors or of the links between them. Each processor has a unique label for each of its links. For convenience, we assume
that the labels are {1, . . ., n − 1}, e.g., as in Fig. 1b. We also assume that there is a “virtual” link from the processor to itself,
and that its label is n.
Correct processors include their identiﬁers in every message they send. The faulty processors might not comply with this
rule, although in what follows we assume that a faulty processor cannot send messages with the identiﬁer of any correct
processor (this corresponds to modelM2). The general case (modelM3), in which faulty processors are able to fake messages
of correct processors, will be considered in Section 7.
2.1. Executions and views
In order to ﬁnd algorithms for solving a decision problem in a network in an optimal number of rounds R, or to ﬁnd a
lower bound on R, it is common to consider the full-information algorithm, in which the correct processors send in every
round their entire history, i.e., all the information available to them so far. In particular, the full-information algorithm can
simulate any other algorithm by disregarding some of the information [16]. Since the algorithm is deterministic, an R-round
execution E of the algorithm is completely deﬁned by the inputs given to the correct processors and the messages that the
faulty processors send to the correct processors.
Formally, an R-round execution E of a system with n = 3f + 1 processors of which at most f are faulty, is deﬁned
by a tuple (C, L, I, M), where C is a set of size 2f + 1 of the identiﬁers of the correct processors; L : C × C → {1, . . ., n}
is a mapping that deﬁnes the topology between the correct processors, i.e., α1’s label for the link which connects it
with α2 is L(α1, α2); I = {inputα}α∈C (where inputα ∈ {0, 1}) is the set of inputs to the correct processors; and M ={
(α, r, l,m)|α ∈ C, R ≥ r ≥ 1, l ∈ {1, . . ., n} \ {L(α, β)}β∈C
}
lists the messages received by the correct processors from the
faulty processors, where (α, r, l,m) speciﬁes that processor α received in round r the message m through link l.
In the sequel, the labels of the links will be disregarded, i.e., it will be assumed that all the messages arrive to a single
mailbox, and that the processors distinguish between them solely by the sender’s id, included in every message. The only
exception is Section 7, which deals with lower bounds for model M3. Obviously, any upper bound proved without relying
on link numbers also holds in a model which includes them.
Deﬁnition 2.1. The set C of the correct processors in an execution E is denoted by correct(E).
Deﬁnition 2.2. The state (view) of a correct processor α is deﬁned as a nested list. At the beginning of round 1, α’s state T0 is
fully described by its id and its input value, i.e., T0 = (α, inputα). The state at the end of round r ≥ 1 is then recursively deﬁned
by Tr = (Tr−1, {m1,m2, . . .,mn−1}), where {m1,m2, . . .,mn−1} is the multiset of messages received from other processors in
round r. It is assumed thatmi = ⊥ for any messagemi that does not have a correct format of a round r − 1 state (awell-formed
message). Note that the message that the processor sends to itself in round r is exactly Tr−1, so there is no need to include it
in the state description. The view of α at the end of round r of E is denoted by Tr(E , α).
The above notation for processor views was chosen since it is convenient to think of processors’ views as trees (e.g., see
[30,4]). Note that if the namespace from which the processor ids are drawn is ﬁnite (though it can be much larger than the
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3f + 1 ids actually assigned to the processors in a given execution), then there is only a ﬁnite number of possible views, and
a ﬁnite number of possible executions of the full-information protocol.
2.2. Similarity
Deﬁnition 2.3. Two R-round executions E1,E2 are similar, denoted by E1 ∼ E2, if there exists α ∈ correct(E1) ∩ correct(E2)
for which the two executions are indistinguishable, i.e., TR(E1, α) = TR(E2, α). Let ≈ denote the transitive closure of the ∼
relation. If E1 ≈ E2, we say that the executions E1 and E2 are similarity connected.
Deﬁnition 2.4. Two executions E1,E2 are strongly similar, denoted by E1 ∼s E2, if there exist α1, . . ., αf+1 ∈ correct(E1) ∩
correct(E2), such that TR(E1, αi) = TR(E2, αi) for every 1 ≤ i ≤ f + 1. The transitive closure of the ∼s relation is denoted by≈s. If E1 ≈s E2, we say that the executions E1 and E2 are strongly similarity connected.
Lemma 2.1. Two executions that are similarity connected are also strongly similarity connected.
Proof. Suppose E1 ∼ E2, and let α be a correct processor for which the executions are indistinguishable. Deﬁne C0 =
correct(E1) ∩ correct(E2), C1 = correct(E1) \ correct(E2), C2 = correct(E2) \ correct(E1). Starting from E1 we construct a
sequence of strongly similar executions that connects E1 with E2.
First, observe that in rounds 1, . . ., R − 1 of E1 all the processors in C0 receive from any γ ∈ C2 a message identical to the
one received by α. Otherwise, there would have existed no execution in which the view of α remains TR(E1, α) and all of C0
and C2 are correct. It is however possible that the message that a processor in C0 receives from γ in round R is not the one
received by α. Therefore, we convert E1 into an execution in which all the processors in C0 receive exactly the same message
from γ in every round. Since this modiﬁcation can be done by changing (the view of) a single correct processor at a time, this
execution is strongly similarity connected to E1. The same procedure can be repeated for every member of C2, until we get
an execution E ′1 in which all the processors in C0 receive exactly the same message as α from every member of C2 in every
round. Similarly, E2 can be converted into an execution E ′2 in which all the correct processors in C0 receive exactly the same
message as α from every member of C1 in every round.
Next, observe that the views in E ′1 and the views in E ′2 of the processors in C0 may differ only by the last round messages
whose id is not in C0 ∪ C1 ∪ C2 = correct(E ′1) ∪ correct(E ′2). Therefore, E ′1 can be converted into an execution E ′′1 in which
the views of all the processors in C0 are the same as in E ′2, by changing the view of one correct processor at a time. It follows
that E ′′1 ∼s E ′2 (the two executions may seem to be equal, however correct(E ′′1 ) = C1 and correct(E ′2) = C2). Thus E1 ≈s E2.

We note that in model M3 (when identity theft is possible) Lemma 2.1 is incorrect, which is directly related to the fact
that in this case BA might require f + 2 rounds (see Section 7).
Deﬁnition 2.5. An execution is called 0-connected if it is similarity connected to an execution in which the inputs of all the
correct processors are 0. Similarly, an execution is called 1-connected if it is similarity connected to an execution in which the
inputs of all the correct processors are 1. Observe that it is possible for an execution to be both 0-connected and 1-connected,
in which case it is called {0,1}-connected, or to be neither 0-connected nor 1-connected.
The agreement property of the BA problem implies that in two similarity connected executions the correct processors
must decide on the same value. Therefore, if there exists an R-round {0,1}-connected execution, there exists no deterministic
procedure which guarantees agreement in R rounds. Speaking informally, if any 0-connected and 1-connected executions
are similarity disconnected, then agreement is possible: the R-round view available to each correct processor enables it to
determine the equivalence class (deﬁned by the ≈ relation) to which the execution belongs. Furthermore, all the correct
processors determine the same equivalence class—the one that contains the execution that actually occurred. A possible
decision rule is to decide 0 if the equivalence class contains 0-connected executions, and to decide 1 otherwise.
Deﬁnition 2.6. A property of executions is called similarity-invariant if it is preserved by the similarity relation.
We are interested in such properties because in order to prove that BA is solvable in R rounds, it is sufﬁcient to ﬁnd a
similarity-invariant property that holds for any 0-connected execution and does not hold for any 1-connected execution.
2.3. Oracle assisted decisions
As described in Section 1, in the standard model, the BA and IC problems can be solved in f + 1 rounds. All the known
BA and IC algorithms which run in the optimal number of rounds (including the original algorithms of Pease, Shostak and
Lamport [27,20]) are either directly based on the Exponential Information Gathering (EIG) algorithm of [4] or equivalent
to it.
A closer look at the EIG algorithm and the differences between the standard model and the models considered in this
paper shows that the knowledge of the identiﬁers in the standard case is not required during the f + 1 rounds of information
M. Okun / Information and Computation 207 (2009) 1351–1368 1355
exchange, but only at the end of round f + 1, in order to make the decision. Therefore if, for example, there were a “friendly”
oracle that at the end of round f + 1 could have provided all the correct processors a set S (|S| = 3f + 1) that contains the
2f + 1 ids of all the correct processors, agreement could have been reached exactly as in the standard model. This is proven
formally in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose that after the communication phase of round f + 1 the processors obtain from an oracle a set S of size
3f + 1, which contains the ids of all the correct processors. Using the information gathered during the f + 1 rounds and the set
S, the processors can solve the IC problem, in which the decision vector is indexed by the elements in S.
The oracle in Theorem 1 is reminiscent of the notion of failure detector [8,14], however its function is quite different
from traditional failure detection. Here, the oracle does not report about the (ids of the) processors that are suspected of
being Byzantine, but rather provides a set of ids that contains all the correct processors’ ids and some faulty ones. Most
importantly, the oracle is assumed to provide exactly the same set of ids to all the correct processors. The complexity of this
task is comparable to that of the IC problem, while failure detectors typically solve problems which are simpler than IC. We
also note that there are no general failure detectors for Byzantine failures, as discussed in detail in Ref. [14].
Intuitively, the algorithm claimed to exist in Theorem 1 is the usual EIG algorithm, with the EIG-tree constructed from
the ids in S. To present the algorithm several deﬁnitions are required.
Deﬁnition 2.7. For a set of size 3f + 1, EIGtree(S) is a tree of depth f + 1, where the root is deﬁned to be at depth 0. The
vertices of EIGtree(S) correspond to strings composed of elements of S. More speciﬁcally, every string σ = α1α2. . .αr , with
length (denoted by |σ |) of at most f + 1, such that α1, α2, . . ., αr ∈ S are all distinct, has a corresponding vertex at level |σ |
of the tree. The tree is organized in such a way that vertices with the same preﬁx are descendants of a common vertex, i.e.,
the parent of σ in the EIG-tree is the vertex that corresponds to α1α2. . .αr−1. The root corresponds to the empty string λ.
Deﬁnition 2.8. A vertex σ = α1α2. . .αr in EIGtree(S) is called correct if the processor αr is correct.
Deﬁnition 2.9. For any vertex σ = α1α2. . .αr in EIGtree(S) and any correct processor α, let vα(σ ) denote the value that αr
has told α that αr−1 has told αr that . . . α1 has told α2 is its input value. If the full-information available to α at the end of
round f + 1 does not include such a value, vα(σ ) is deﬁned to be ⊥.
To solve the IC problem, at the end of round f + 1 every correct processor α obtains the set S from the oracle, constructs
EIGtree(S) and assigns to every vertex σ a value, denoted by treeα(σ ), which is deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 2.10. If σ is a leaf, then the value processor α assigns to the vertex, treeα(σ ), is deﬁned to be vα(σ ). For the rest
of the vertices, the value is computed recursively from the bottom up, as follows: treeα(σ ) is ⊥ if σ does not have at least
2f + 1 − |σ | children which share a common assigned value (other than ⊥). Otherwise, treeα(σ ) is the value assigned to a
majority of σ ’s children.
The decision vector of processor α is given by the values assigned to the vertices of depth 1, i.e., {treeα(γ )}γ∈S .
Property 2.1. For any correct vertexσ in EIGtree(S) and correct processorα, treeα(σ ) = vα(σ ),which implies that all the correct
processors compute an identical value for σ (denoted by tree(σ )).
Proof. The proof is by reverse induction on the height of the vertex in the tree. If σ = α1, . . ., αf+1 is a correct leaf, the
result immediately follows from the deﬁnition. Let σ = α1α2. . .αr , from the induction it follows that the property holds
for vertices of depth r + 1. Since αr is a correct processor, either it sends the same value v = vαr (α1α2. . .αr−1) to all the
processors or sends no value corresponding to α1α2. . .αr−1 at all. Thus vα(σ ′) = v (or vα(σ ′) = ⊥) for any correct child
σ ′ of σ . By the induction, it follows that vα(σ ′) = treeα(σ ′). The vertex σ has at most f faulty children, whose assigned
value can be arbitrary. On the other hand, it has at least 2f + 1 − |σ | correct children. Since all the correct children have the
same assigned value vαr (α1α2. . .αr−1), Deﬁnition 2.10 implies the result. 
Deﬁnition 2.11. A cut in EIGtree(S) is a set C of vertices that intersects exactly once every path from the root to a leaf
[19]. For a subsetS′ ⊆ S of identiﬁers, such that ∣∣S′∣∣ ≥ n− f , the cutC(S′) is deﬁned as the set{α1α2. . .αr ∣∣αr ∈ S′, α1 /∈ S′, . . .,
αr−1 /∈ S′ }.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let S′ ⊂ S be the subset of identiﬁers of the correct processors. From Property 2.1 it follows that the
value assigned to any vertex in the cut C(S′) is the same among all the correct processors. Therefore, this also holds for all the
vertices above the cut and in particular for vertices of depth 1. Thus agreement is guaranteed. The validity property (i.e., the
requirement that tree(α) = inputα for every correct processor α) follows directly from the deﬁnition of the tree(·) function
and Property 2.1. 
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Deﬁnition 2.12. For any execution E and a set S of size 3f + 1 such that correct(E) ⊂ S and α ∈ S, let Dec(E , S, α) denote
the decision on the input value which corresponds to the id α, obtained by the algorithm described in Theorem 1.
Deﬁnition 2.13. Let Dec(E , S) ∈ {0, 1} denote the decision value obtained in execution E with the help of the set S, according
to the following rule. If the total number of 1s and ⊥s among {Dec(E , S, α)}α∈S exceeds f then Dec(E , S) = 1, otherwise
Dec(E , S) = 0.
While “in reality” there are no assisting oracles, the notion of a decision reached with the help of such an oracle, introduced
in Theorem 1, turns to be extremely useful for our purpose. We shall see that under certain conditions the value Dec(E , S)
(where S satisﬁes the conditions of Deﬁnition 2.12) is similarity-invariant.
3. The (f + 1)-round upper bound for modelM1
This section shows that in model M1, for a system with n processors of which f < n/3 are faulty, an (f + 1)-round
execution in which the input values of all the correct processors are 0 is not similarity connected to an execution in which
the input values of all the correct processors are 1. To simplify the presentation, we assume that n = 3f + 1. Clearly, this
claim follows from the main result of this paper, presented in Section 5, which proves the same upper bound for model M2.
The main purpose of this section is to present the proof technique in a relatively simple case.
Deﬁnition 3.1. A set S of processor ids is consistent with an execution E if |S| = 3f + 1 and correct(E) ⊂ S.
The outline of the proof is as follows. During the (f + 1)-round execution, every correct processor is engaged in con-
structing its view by repeatedly broadcasting all the information available to it. As shown in Section 2.3, if at the end of round
f + 1 the processors are provided by an oracle with a set S that is consistent with the execution, then the BA problem can be
solved. Here, we show that the existence of a consistent set of ids which results in 0 decision is a similarity-invariant property.
That is, if in an execution E1 the correct processors provided with a set S decide 0, then for any E2 ∼ E1 there exists a set
consistent with E2 which also provides a 0 decision. This similarity-invariant property shows that (f + 1)-round execution
in which the input values of all the correct processors are 0, cannot be similarity connected to an execution in which the
input values of at least f + 1 correct processors are 1. The formal proof follows.
Lemma 3.1. Let E be an (f + 1)-round execution, and suppose that Dec(E , S) = 0. If there is no processor in E whose identiﬁer
is β ∈ S, then Dec(E , {γ } ∪ S \ {β})= 0 for any γ /∈ S.
Proof. For a string σ of identiﬁers from S, let σ ′ be the string accepted from σ by replacing β with γ (if β does not appear
in σ then σ ′ = σ ). There is a trivial isomorphism between EIGtree(S) and EIGtree({γ } ∪ S \ {β}), deﬁned by σ → σ ′.
Letσ ∈ C(correct(E) ∪ {β}). Ifσ is a correct vertex, thenσ does not containβ . Therefore,σ ′ = σ and tree(σ ) = tree(σ ′).
Otherwise, σ ends with β and is entirely composed of identiﬁers belonging to the faulty processors, or to no processor at
all. Let α1, . . ., α2f+1 be the ids of the correct processors. According to the agreement algorithm described in Section 2.3 (see
Deﬁnition 2.9), v(σαk) = ⊥ for any 1 ≤ k ≤ 2f + 1. Property 2.1 implies that tree(σαk) = ⊥. It follows that tree(σ ) = ⊥,
while tree(σ ′) can be ⊥ or 0 or 1. Deﬁnition 2.10 implies that for any vertex σ above the cut C(correct(E) ∪ {β}), if tree(σ )
is 0 or 1 then so is tree(σ ′), but not vice versa. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
Lemma 3.2. LetE1 andE2 be two strongly similar (f + 1)-round executions. If Dec(E1, S1) = 0, then there exists a set of identiﬁers
S2, consistent with E2, such that Dec(E2, S2) = 0.
Proof.Let
{
α1, . . ., αf+1
} ⊆ correct(E1) ∩ correct(E2)be the correct processors for whichTf+1(E1, αi) = Tf+1(E2, αi) (where
1 ≤ i ≤ f + 1). Let {β1, . . ., βL} = correct(E2) \ correct(E1). Observe that L ≤ f .
First consider the simple case, in which β1, . . ., βL ∈ S1. The proof is completed by setting S2 = S1.
Next, w.l.o.g., consider the case β1 /∈ S1. In the ﬁrst round of E1 α1, . . ., αf+1 receive a message from β1, thus there must
exist an id γ1 ∈ S1 which does not belong to any processor in the execution E1 (this follows from the fact that |S1 ∪ {γ1}| =
3f + 2, while only 3f + 1 ids belong to processors). By Lemma 3.1, Dec(E1, {β1} ∪ S1 \ {γ1}) = 0. Other identiﬁers among
β2, . . ., βL that do not belong to S1 can be handled similarly. 
Theorem 2. In modelM1 there is no (f + 1)-round execution of the full-information protocol which is {0, 1}-connected.
Proof. Lemma 3.2 shows that the existence of a set S consistent with an execution E such that Dec(E , S) = 0 is a similarity-
invariant property. Clearly it holds for any execution in which the inputs of all the correct processors are 0 and does not hold
for any execution in which the inputs of all the correct processors are 1. Thus any such two executions are not similarity
connected. 
If the namespace to which the ids of the processors belong is ﬁnite and known a priori (though the actual 3f + 1 ids
are not), Theorem 2 shows that consensus in model M1 can be solved in f + 1 rounds. Speciﬁcally, since the complex
of all possible executions is ﬁnite, every correct processor is able to check whether the executions which correspond to
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its ﬁnal view are 0-connected or not, and decide accordingly. In Section 6, it is formally shown that a similar, though
more complicated, approach can be used to solve consensus in the case of an a priori unknown or inﬁnite identiﬁer
namespace.
4. Compatibility graphs
Model M2 introduces a relaxation which permits the faulty processors to include in their messages any id not belonging
to a correct processor. This brings along a new difﬁculty, which stems from the ability of several faulty processors to send
messages with the same id. Such id sharing allows the f faulty processors to present the correct processors more than f
identiﬁers, none of which can be detected as faulty by a majority of the correct processors.
We demonstrate this new difﬁculty using a scenario argument (see [16], or the original paper of Fischer, Lynch and Merritt
[18]). Let G = G(V , E) be a communication graph (in which every node has a unique id) with the following properties: (i)
every node of the graph has a degree of at most 3f ; (ii) every node of the graph belongs to a (2f + 1)-clique; (iii) every two
(2f + 1)-cliques intersect in at least f + 1 nodes. Although at ﬁrst sight it might not be immediately clear, such graphs do
exist. For instance, for f = 6, the complement of such a graph, with size 20 > 3f + 1, is presented below. In this example,
properties (i) and (ii) are trivial. To verify property (iii), notice that two cliques of size 13 in any graph of size 20 must intersect
in at least 6 vertices. If they intersect in exactly 6 vertices, then each of these vertices has degree 19. However, in the example,
all vertices have degree at most 18.
Let A be any algorithm that solves the BA problem in model M2, in a system with 3f + 1 processors, of which up to
f may be faulty. Due to property (i), it is possible to run A on each node of G. The resulting execution, together with any
(2f + 1)-clique C in G, allows to deﬁne a scenario (for the completely connected network with 3f + 1 processors) in which
the correct processors correspond to nodes in C and the faulty processors send exactly those messages that the nodes in C
receive from the rest of the nodes in G. In this scenario none of the identiﬁers of the faulty processors can be detected as being
faulty by a majority of the correct processors, because for every such id α there exists another scenario which corresponds to
a (2f + 1)-clique C′ that contains α (which must exist according to property (ii)). In both scenarios all the messages received
by a majority of the correct processors (processors in C ∩ C′, which according to (iii) is of size f + 1 at the least) are exactly
the same, while in the scenario corresponding to C′, α belongs to a correct processor.
The EIG-tree data structure, which was used in the standard BA algorithms and in Section 3 to prove the (f + 1)-round
upper bound for model M1, is insufﬁcient for handling the problem demonstrated above, for several reasons. First, observe
that in order to have a correct vertex on every path from the root to a leaf, the tree would need to have more than f + 1
layers, which makes it inappropriate for an (f + 1)-round upper bound. In addition, the fact that certain combinations of ids
cannot be correct simultaneously, is not represented by the EIG-tree. Here we introduce an additional data structure, called
compatibility graph, which will provide the additional features required for establishing the upper bound.
Deﬁnition 4.1. The compatibility graph associated with Tr(E0, α), the view of correct processor α at the end of round r, is
denoted by G(Tr(E0, α)). The graph is deﬁned recursively, based on the round number. For r = 1, G(Tr(E0, α)) is a fully
connected graph whose vertices are the ids from which α received a well-formed message in the ﬁrst round. For r > 1 an
edge {β1, β2} has to satisfy the following conditions in order to appear in G(Tr(E0, α)):
(i) {β1, β2} appears in G(Tr−1(E0, α)).
(ii) Let T1 and T2 denote the round r − 1 views of β1 and β2, as reported in their round r messages to α. It is required that{β1, β2} ∈ E(G(Ti)) (i = 1, 2).
(iii) There must exist 2f − 2 distinct processors, other than α, β1 and β2, such that their round r − 1 views T ′1, . . . ,T ′2f−2,
as reported in their round r messages to α, satisfy {β1, β2} ∈ E(G(T ′i )), where 2f − 2 ≥ i ≥ 1.
It is possible that an edge which satisﬁes all of the above conditions eventually will not belong to G(Tr(E0, α)). This
happens when at least one of β1, β2 does not satisfy the requirements for vertices. Speciﬁcally, a vertex β must satisfy the
following conditions in order to belong to G(Tr(E0, α)):
(i′) β belongs to G(Tr−1(E0, α)).
(ii′) There exist 2f distinct processors, other than α, such that their round r − 1 views T1, . . . ,T2f , as reported in their
round r messages to α, satisfy β ∈ V(G(Ti)), where 2f ≥ i ≥ 1.
(iii′) For the well-formed message m that was received from β in round r − 1, there must exist 2f − 1 processors, other
than α and β , whose round r messages acknowledge receiving m from β .
(iv′) Let T denote the round r − 1 view contained in the message received from β in round r. For any vertex γ (edge
{γ1, γ2}) of G(T) there must exist f + 1 processors whose round r − 2 views T ′1, . . . ,T ′f+1, as reported in their round r − 1
messages to α, satisfy γ ∈ V(G(T ′i )) ({γ1, γ2} ∈ E(G(T ′i ))), where f + 1 ≥ i ≥ 1.
(v′) There must exist a (2f + 1)-clique (of vertices and edges satisfying the above conditions) which contains β .
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Intuitively, the compatibility graph G(Tr(E0, α)) represents some of the knowledge available to the correct processor α
by the end of round r. Each vertex in G(Tr(E0, α)) represents a processor, where processors that α can infer to be faulty
(according to the tests in the above deﬁnition) are not present. A non-edge between two vertices β1, β2 means that the
corresponding processors contradict each other in a way visible to α, which makes it impossible for both of them to be
correct, e.g., one of them claims to have an id that the second one has not seen.
It is important to observe that the deﬁnition given above is functional, i.e., it provides a procedure by which the compati-
bility graph can be computed from a view of a processor.
Deﬁnition 4.2. A compatibility graph of an executionE0 after round r ≥ 1, denoted byGr(E0), is the union of the compatibility
graphs of the correct processors:
V(Gr(E0)) =
⋃
α∈correct(E0)
V(G(Tr(E0, α))), E(Gr(E0)) =
⋃
α∈correct(E0)
E(G(Tr(E0, α))).
The Gr(E0) graph can be thought of as representing facts known to every correct processors by the end of round r of E0.
For example, if some β is not a vertex of Gr(E0), then all the correct processors know that β is not an id of a correct processor,
and if there is no edge between β1 and β2 in G
r(E0), all the correct processors know that at most one of β1, β2 belongs to a
correct processor. Below we establish some properties of the compatibility graphs.
Property 4.1. Let E be an execution and suppose that β /∈ correct(E). Unless f + 1 correct processors receive the same message
from β in round r − 1, it holds that ∀α ∈ correct(E) β /∈ V(G(Tr(E , α))). Furthermore, in case where a majority of the correct
processors do receive exactly the samemessage from β , it holds that β /∈ V(G(Tr(E , α))) for every α ∈ correct(E)which received
from β a different message.
Proof. This property follows from the fact that every vertex of G(Tr(E , α)) satisﬁes requirement (iii′). 
Property 4.1 implies that if β ∈ V(Gr+1(E)), then there exists a unique well-formed message received from β in round r
by a majority of the correct processors. This message contains a view T , i.e., T = Tr−1(E ′, β) where E ′ is some execution for
which β ∈ correct(E ′). Therefore, even if β /∈ correct(E), its compatibility graph at the end of round r − 1 (the graph G(T))
is well deﬁned.
Property 4.2. If at the end of round r of an execution E a vertex β (an edge {β1, β2}) does not belong to the compatibility graphs
of at least f + 1 correct processors, then β ({β1, β2}) does not belong to Gr+1(E).
Proof. The claim follows from requirement (ii′), satisﬁed by every vertex of G(Tr+1(E , α)) for any α ∈ correct(E). Similarly,
requirement (iii) implies the claim for the edge {β1, β2}. 
Property 4.3. Let T be the round r − 1 view in the message that a correct processor α receives from β in round r of execution E.
If G(T) is not a subgraph of Gr−2(E), then β /∈ V(G(Tr(E , α))).
Proof. Suppose that G(T) contains a vertex or an edge which is not in the round r − 2 compatibility graph of any correct
processor. According to property (iv’), β cannot be a vertex of G(Tr(E , α)). 
Property 4.4. For any α ∈ correct(E) and any round r, correct(E) is a clique in G(Tr(E , α)).
Proof. The proof is by induction on the round number. For r = 1 the claim clearly holds. For the induction step, observe
that conditions (i)–(iii) required from an edge {α1, α2} are satisﬁed according to the induction assumption when α1, α2 ∈
correct(E). Similarly, conditions (i′)–(iii′) are satisﬁed according to the induction assumption. Thus it remains to show that
condition (iv′) is satisﬁed as well (then (v′) will hold automatically).
Let α0 be any correct processor. Observe that every vertex or edge in G(T
r−1(E , α0)) is also contained in 2f + 1 compat-
ibility graphs of round r − 2, as they are represented in the messages received by α0 in round r − 1 (see conditions (i)–(iii)
and (i′)-(ii′)). At least f + 1 of these messages belong to correct processors and thus are received by all processors. This
implies that property (iv′) holds for α0. 
Lemma 4.1. Suppose that r ≥ 2, and that G = G(Tr(E0, α)) where α ∈ correct(E0), or G = Gr(E0). Then G has the following
properties: (i) 4f ≥ |V (G)|≥ 2f + 1; (ii) every vertex of G belongs to a (2f + 1)-clique; (iii) there exists a (2f + 1)-clique C in
G such that ∀α ∈ C deg(α) ≤ 3f .
Proof. First consider the case in which G is a compatibility graph of some processor. By deﬁnition, every vertex of the
graph belongs to a (2f + 1)-clique, so that (ii) holds. Furthermore, in this case the graph has at most 3f + 1 vertices and
correct(E0) ⊆ V(G). Thus properties (i) and (iii) trivially hold.
Next we prove the lemma for the case in which G = Gr(E0).
(i) Suppose that β ∈ V (G). From Property 4.1 it follows that at least f + 1 correct processors received a message with
id β in the ﬁrst round. The total number of messages sent by the faulty processors to the correct processors in any round
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is (2f + 1)f . Therefore the number of ids, not including those in correct(E0), which in the ﬁrst round appear in messages
received by at least f + 1 correct processors, can be at most (2f + 1)f /(f + 1). Since (2f + 1)f /(f + 1) < 2f , it follows
that Gr(E0) has no more than 4f vertices.
(ii) Follows immediately from the deﬁnition of G as the union of compatibility graphs of individual correct processors,
for which this property was already proved.
(iii) correct(E0) is one such clique, since any vertex corresponding to an id of a correct processor can be connected only
to ids from which it received a message in the ﬁrst round. 
Deﬁnition 4.3. A graph G that satisﬁes the properties (i)–(iii) of Lemma 4.1 for a given f is called an f -graph.
Deﬁnition 4.4. Given an f -graph G, a set S is called G-consistent if any U ⊆ S, such that |U| ≥ |S| /3, intersects every
(2f + 1)-clique in G.
The importance of such sets is explained by the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.2. LetE be an execution. Suppose thatG = Gr(E)orG = G(Tr(E , α)),whereα ∈ correct(E). If the set S is G-consistent,
then |S ∩ correct(E)| > 2 |S| /3.
Proof. Let U = S \ correct(E). Since U does not intersect the (2f + 1)-clique formed by the ids of the correct processors in
G, its size must be less than |S| /3. 
Lemma 4.3. If G and H are f -graphs, where S is G-consistent and H is a subgraph of G, then S is also H-consistent.
Proof. Immediate from the deﬁnitions. 
4.1. Combinatorial properties of f -graphs
In this section, we deal with the combinatorial properties of the f -graphs and their consistent sets, which are crucial for
the proof of the upper bound in Section 5.
Lemma 4.4. Let G be an f -graph. Then |V(G)| < 7f /2 + 1.
Proof. Suppose the claim is false and let G be a counterexample. Let V1 ⊆ V(G) be a (2f + 1)-clique all of whose vertices
have a degree of at most 3f (such a clique must exist by deﬁnition). Let V2 = V(G) \ V1. Let ρ = |V2| /f . Deﬁne a bipartite
graph H = H(V1, V2; E) as follows: {u, v} ∈ E(H) ⇔ {u, v} /∈ E(G), (where u ∈ V1 and v ∈ V2). The inequality degG(u) ≤ 3f ,
where u ∈ V1, and the deﬁnition of H imply
u ∈ V1 ⇒ degH(u) ≥ (ρ − 1)f . (1)
Let v0 ∈ V2 be a vertex with degH(v0) = maxv∈V2 degH(v) and let V0 ⊆ V(G) be a (2f + 1)-clique to which v0 belongs.
Observe that the sets V0 and V1 intersect in at least f + 1 vertices, since otherwise the degrees of the vertices in V0 ∩ V1 (in
G) are higher than 3f (V0 ∩ V1 /= ∅ because |V(G)| < 4f ). Also note that V0 is an independent set in H.
Let d = degH(v0). From (1) and |V1| > |V2| it follows that
d ≥ (ρ − 1)f . (2)
In addition, the deﬁnitions of v0 and d imply that
f + 1 ≤ |V0 ∩ V1| ≤ 2f + 1 − d. (3)
Observe that there are at least |V0 ∩ V1| (ρ − 1)f edges incident to the vertices of V0 ∩ V1 in H, and that all these edges are
also incident to V2 \ V0. Therefore, if the inequality
|V0 ∩ V1| (ρ − 1)f > (ρf − |V0 ∩ V2|) d (4)
holds, we get a contradiction. It sufﬁces to show that the following inequality, which is accepted from (4) by substituting the
maximal possible value of |V0 ∩ V1| and the minimal possible value of |V0 ∩ V2|, holds
(2f + 1 − d)(ρ − 1)f > (ρf − d) d, (5)
since together with (2) the inequality (4) is implied. This last inequality is quadratic in d, and the roots of the corresponding
quadratic equation are
(ρf − f /2) ∓ 1
2
√
(3 − 2ρ)2f 2 − 4f (ρ − 1).
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It follows that for any d outside the interval (d1, d2), where d1,2 = (ρf − f /2) ∓ |2ρ − 3| f /2, (5) holds. In particular,
when ρ ≥ 3/2 (5) holds for any d ≤ f , which in turn is guaranteed by (3). Thus, we proved that (4) holds, and therefore no
such G exists. 
Lemma 4.5. For small values of f the upper bound on the number of vertices in an f -graph is as follows:
For f = 1, 2, 3 3f + 1,
and for f = 4, 5, 6 3f + 2.
Proof. For f = 1, 2, 4 the bound follows directly from Lemma 4.4. For f = 3 it is easy to verify that in the proof of Lemma 4.4
the inequality (5) holds for every 3 ≥ d ≥ 1 and ρ = 4/3. Similarly, when f = 5 (5) holds for every 5 ≥ d ≥ 1 and ρ = 7/5;
and when f = 6 (5) holds for every 6 ≥ d ≥ 1 and ρ = 8/6. 
Lemma 4.6. Let G be an f -graph. If |V(G)| = 3f + 1 + k and k > 0, then G (the complement of G, i.e. e ∈ E(G) ⇔ e /∈ E(G))
contains a matching of order 2k + 1.
Proof. Let H = H(V1, V2; E) be the bipartite graph deﬁned in Lemma 4.4. We prove that H contains a matching of order at
least 2k + 1. Since H is a subgraph of G, the lemma follows.
There is a correspondence between maximum matchings in H and the maximum ﬂow from s to t in the network H′
deﬁned by V(H′) = V(H) ∪ {s, t} and E(H′) = E(H) ∪ {s, u}u∈V1 ∪ {v, t}v∈V2 (e.g., see [9]). Also, by the max-ﬂow min-cut
theorem [9], there exists a cut in H′ whose capacity is equal to the maximum ﬂow. To prove the lemma it is sufﬁcient to show
that the capacity of every cut in H′ is at least 2k + 1.
Let (S, T) be a cut in H′ (where s ∈ S and t ∈ T). Since the degree of every vertex in V1 is at least k and the degree of every
vertex in V2 is at most f , the capacity of the cut is at least
|V1 ∩ T| + |V2 ∩ S| + max {0, (2f + 1 − |V1 ∩ T|) k − f |V2 ∩ S|} ≥ (2f + 1)k − (f − 1) (|V2 ∩ S| + |V1 ∩ T|) ,
where the last inequality is implied by k ≤ f . If |V1 ∩ T| + |V2 ∩ S| ≥ 2k + 1, the proof is completed. Otherwise, the above
expression is not less than (2f + 1)k − (f − 1)2k ≥ 3k ≥ 2k + 1. 
Theorem 3. Let G be an f -graph. There exists a G-consistent set S, for which |S| − (|S| − 1)/3 ≥ f + 1, such that:
(i) If |V(G)| ≥ 3f + 1 + (f + 1)/3, then (|S| − 1)/3 ≤ f − 3.
(ii) If |V(G)| = 3f + 1 + k, where (f + 1)/3 > k ≥ 1, then (|S| − 1)/3 ≤ f − 2 and |S| ≥ 3(f − max(k, 5/3)) + 1.
Proof. When |V(G)| ≤ 3f + 1, S can be chosen to be V(G), in which case it is obvious that any subset of size at least |S|/3
of S must intersect every (2f + 1)-clique in G. By Lemma 4.5, for f ≤ 3 an f -graph is of size at most 3f + 1, so we are done
with this case.
When |V(G)| = 3f + 1 + k, where k = 1, let M be a matching of order 3 in G, which exists according to Lemma 4.6. Let
S = V(G) \ M. It follows that |S| = 3f − 4, so that for any f ≥ 4 the set S satisﬁes all the required inequalities. Next, we
check that S is G-consistent. Let C be any (2f + 1)-clique in G. Since C is an independent set in G, it follows that |C ∩ M| ≤ 3
and therefore |C ∩ S| ≥ 2f − 2. Thus any subset of S of size at least |S|/3 intersects C.
Next, consider the case k > 1. From Lemma 4.5 it follows that in this case f ≥ 7. Let M be a matching of order 2k in G
(by Lemma 4.6 such matching must exist), and let S = V(G) \ M. It follows that |S| = 3f + 1 + k − 2(2k) = 3(f − k) + 1.
Since by Lemma 4.4 k < f /2, |S| − (|S| − 1)/3 ≥ f + 1. Also, when k > 2, it holds that (|S| − 1)/3 ≤ f − 3, and for
k = 2 condition (ii) holds. Finally, we check that S isG-consistent. Let C be any (2f + 1)-clique inG. Since C is an independent
set in G, it follows that |C ∩ M| ≤ 2k. Therefore |C ∩ S| ≥ 2(f − k) + 1. Thus any subset of S whose size is at least |S|/3
intersects C. 
4.2. EIG algorithm revisited
In Section 2.3, it was shown that if at the end of round f + 1 an oracle provides the processors with a set S of sizen = 3f + 1
that includes the ids of all the correct processors, then consensus can be solved (see Theorem 1). The requirement which
is essential for this result is that more than 2/3 of the ids in S belong to correct processors. On the other hand, the exact
size of the set is not a necessary condition, so that it is actually possible to extend Theorem 1 to sets of ids of different
sizes. Furthermore, when the set is smaller than 3f + 1, the number of rounds required to reach consensus decreases,
correspondingly. Therefore, for such smaller sets of ids, the processors can agree not only on their initial input values, but
also on messages they send in later rounds. This is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Suppose that in an execution E , after the communication phase of round f + 1, the processors obtain from an
oracle a set S, which satisﬁes |S ∩ correct(E)| > 2 |S| /3. Using the information gathered during the f + 1 rounds and the set
S, the processors can agree on the messages that the members of S have sent in round r, where f + 1 − (|S| − 1)/3 ≥ r ≥ 1.
Furthermore, if there existα1, . . ., αk ∈ S ∩ correct(E) such thatβ /∈ V(G(Tr(E , αi))),where k ≥ i ≥ 1, and k ≥ (|S| − 1)/3 +
1, then the agreed upon value for round r message of β is ⊥.
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Proof. The required agreement is achieved by the same procedure described in the proof of Theorem 1, where the parameter
f is replaced by (|S| − 1)/3, round r is considered to be the ﬁrst one, and the messages sent in this round have the role of
input values. The message received from some γ is considered by a correct processor α to be a legal input value if and only
if it is well-formed and γ ∈ V(G(Tr(E , α))). That is, if α recognized at the end of round r that γ is faulty, then it acts as if no
message from γ is received. In particular, it follows that for any αi (k ≥ i ≥ 1) it holds that v(βαi) = ⊥, where βαi denotes
the level 2 vertices in EIGtree(S). Therefore, tree(β) = ⊥. 
Deﬁnition 4.5. For any α ∈ S, letDecr(E , S, α) denote the decision on the message α sent in round r, obtained as described in
Theorem 4. Observe thatDecr(E , S, α) is well deﬁned if and only if |S ∩ correct(E)|> 2 |S| /3 and r ≤ f + 1 − |S \ correct(E)|.
Note that the latter inequality is satisﬁed whenever r ≤ f + 1 − (|S| − 1)/3.
Observe that the deﬁnition of Dec(E , S, α) given in Deﬁnition 2.12 is a special case of the above deﬁnition for |S| = 3f + 1
and r = 1, i.e., Dec1(E , S, α) =Dec(E , S, α). In particular, from Deﬁnition 4.5 it follows that for any α ∈ correct(E) ∩ S it holds
that Decr(E , S, α) = Tr−1(E , α). If α ∈ S is not an id of a correct processor, it is possible that this decision is ⊥ rather than
some view, as stated in Theorem 4.
5. The (f + 1)-round upper bound for modelM2
In this section, we prove that when identity theft is not allowed, there is no equivalence class of (f + 1)-round executions
that contains a {0,1}-connected execution. The general idea of the proof is similar to that used in Section 3 to prove the (f + 1)-
round upper bound for model M1: we would like to ﬁnd a similarity-invariant property that holds for every execution in
which the inputs of all the correct processors are 0, and does not hold for any execution in which the inputs of all the correct
processors are 1. For model M1, we were able to ﬁnd such a similarity-invariant property. Brieﬂy, the idea was that if for an
execution E there exists a set of ids S (with correct(E) ⊂ S) which results in 0 decision, and E ′ ∼ E , then we can ﬁnd a set S′
with correct(E ′) ⊂ S′ which results in a 0 decision in E ′ (see Lemma 3.2). To construct such an S′, we observed that whenever
correct(E ′) ⊂ S, there must exist an id in S that does not belong to any processor, so that it contributes only ⊥ values, and
thus can be replaced by any other id without altering the 0 decision.
The case of the M2 model is complicated by the fact that there might be more than f faulty ids, none of which is detected
as faulty by a majority of the correct processors, as was already discussed in Section 4. Therefore, even if correct(E ′) ⊂ S,
there is no simple way to demonstrate the existence of a faulty id (in S) which contributes only ⊥ or 1 values.
To make the proof strategy work for M2, several similarity-invariant properties will be required, each one for different
similarity-connected equivalence classes of executions. There will be four different similarity-invariant properties, of the
following two types:
• There exists a set S of ids, of which more than 2/3 belong to the correct processors, such that the fact that more than
2|S|/3 of the ids in S are correct becomes common knowledge1 among sufﬁciently many correct processors in S (or even
all of them) by the end of round f + 1.
• The decision value that would have been agreed upon if the correct processors had the information on processor ids is 0.
This similarity-invariant property was already used in Section 3.
We will show that a property of the ﬁrst type holds for any execution in which the total number of ids that cannot be detected
as faulty by any majority of the correct processors, exceeds 3f + 1. To prove this we rely on the compatibility graphs. Property
of the ﬁrst type also holds for certain cases without faulty ids beyond f , while in all other cases the second similarity-invariant
property will be shown to hold.
In more detail, let E be an execution which has “extra” ids. To ﬁnd a set S for the similarity-invariant property, consider the
compatibility graph G2(E). Whenever it has more than 3f + 1 vertices, Theorem 3 implies that there is a G2(E)-consistent
set of ids, which is exactly the set required. When the compatibility graph G2(E) has at most 3f + 1 vertices, there are two
possible cases. If G2(E) has many non-edges, it is still possible to ﬁnd a set S as described above. However, if G2(E) has only
few non-edges, then the value of Dec
(
E , V(G2(E))
)
is by itself a similarity-invariant property.
Deﬁnition 5.1. The equivalence classes C of the executions in modelM2 are classiﬁed into four categories, as speciﬁed below.
(I)
{
C
∣∣∣∃E ∈ C s.t. ∣∣∣V(G2(E))∣∣∣ ≥ 3f + (f + 1)/3 + 1}.
(II)
{
C
∣∣∣∃E ∈ C s.t. ∣∣∣V(G2(E))∣∣∣ > 3f + 1 ∧ ∀E ∈ C ∣∣∣V(G2(E))∣∣∣ < 3f + (f + 1)/3 + 1}.
(III)
⎧⎨
⎩C
∣∣∣∣∣∣
∀E ∈ C
∣∣∣V(G2(E))∣∣∣ ≤ 3f + 1 ∧
∃E ∈ C s.t. G2(E) contains a matching of size max
{
0,
∣∣∣V(G2(E))∣∣∣− (3f − 1)}
⎫⎬
⎭ .
(IV) Classes that do not belong to any of the above categories.
In what follows we construct for each category a similarity-invariant property which shows that it does not contain an
equivalence class of executions that includes {0,1}-connected executions.
1 In the sense of [15,22].
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5.1. Category I
Lemma 5.1. For any execution E that satisﬁes |V(G2(E))| ≥ 3f + (f + 1)/3 + 1, there exists a set S of identiﬁers such that:
(i) |S| − (|S| − 1)/3 ≥ f + 1.
(ii) |S ∩ correct(E)| > 2 |S| /3.
(iii) (|S| − 1)/3 ≤ f − 3.
(iv) ∀β ∈ S, S is G(Dec4(E , S, β))-consistent, unless Dec4(E , S, β) = ⊥ (the latter might happen only if β /∈ correct(E) ∩ S).
Proof. Consider the f -graph G2(E). By Theorem 3 it is guaranteed that there exists a G2(E)-consistent set S such that |S| −
(|S| − 1)/3 ≥ f + 1 and (|S| − 1)/3 ≤ f − 3. Lemma 4.2 implies that |S ∩ correct(E)| > 2 |S| /3. Let β ∈ S. According
to Theorem 4, if Dec4(E , S, β) /= ⊥, then β belongs to the round 4 compatibility graphs of a majority of the correct processors
in S. Therefore, Property 4.3 implies that the compatibility graph G(Dec4(E , S, β)) must be a subgraph of G2(E). By Lemma
4.3, S is G(Dec4(E , S, β))-consistent. 
Lemma 5.2. If a set S satisﬁes properties (i)–(iv) of Lemma 5.1 for some execution E , then S satisﬁes these properties for any
execution in the equivalence class of E.
Proof. Let E ∼s E ′. From properties (i) and (ii) it follows that |S ∩ correct(E)| ≥ f + 1. Thus there must exist α0 ∈ S ∩
correct(E) ∩ correct(E ′) that has the same view in E and E ′. Since S isG(Dec4(E , S, α0))-consistent, and sinceG(Dec4(E , S, α0))= G(T3(E , α0)) = G(T3(E ′, α0)), by Lemma 4.2 it follows that ∣∣S ∩ correct(E ′)∣∣ > 2 |S| /3. Together with property (iii), this
implies that
∣∣S \ correct(E ′)∣∣ ≤ f − 3. Thus {Dec4(E ′, S, α)}
α∈S are well deﬁned (recall Deﬁnition 4.5). Since the view of
α0 remains unchanged, the decisions on the 4th round messages remain unchanged as well, i.e., ∀β ∈ S Dec4(E ′, S, β) =
Dec4(E , S, β). 
Corollary 5.3. An equivalence class C of category I cannot contain a {0, 1}-connected execution.
Proof. Suppose the contrary. Let E0 ∈ C be an execution in which the inputs of all the correct processors are 0, and let E1 ∈ C
be an execution in which the inputs of all the correct processors are 1. Since C belongs to category I, Lemma 5.2 implies that
there exists a set S, such that |S ∩ correct(E0)| > 2 |S| /3 and |S ∩ correct(E1)| > 2 |S| /3. In other words, more than 2/3 of
S are ids that in E0 correspond to correct processors with input 0, and at the same time more than 2/3 of S are ids that in E1
correspond to correct processors with input 1. This is a contradiction, since it is possible to consider the input of a correct
processor as part of its id, which means that every id in S has exactly one input value that corresponds to it. 
5.2. Category II
Lemma 5.4. For any execution E that satisﬁes |V(G2(E))| = 3f + k + 1, where (f + 1)/3 > k > 0, there exists a set S of
identiﬁers such that:
(i) |S| − (|S| − 1)/3 ≥ f + 1.
(ii) |S ∩ correct(E)| > 2 |S| /3.
(iii) (|S| − 1)/3 ≤ f − 2.
(iv) |S| ≥ 3(f − max(k, 5/3)) + 1.
(v) S is consistent with more than 2 |S| /3 of the graphs in the set
{
G(Dec3(E , S, α))
}
α∈S .
Proof. Consider the graph G2(E). By Theorem 3 and Lemma 4.2 there exists a G2(E)-consistent set S that satisﬁes the
inequalities in (i)-(iv). To verify (v), observe that for any α ∈ S ∩ correct(E) it holds that G(Dec3(E , S, α)) = G(T2(E , α)) is a
subgraph of G2(E). Therefore S is G(Dec3(E , S, α))-consistent (Lemma 4.3). 
Lemma 5.5. Let C be an equivalence class of executions, such that ∀E ∈ C |V(G2(E))| ≤ 3f + k + 1 and ∃E0 ∈ C with|V(G2(E0))| = 3f + k + 1, where k < (f + 1)/3. If a set S satisﬁes properties (i)-(v) in Lemma 5.4 for E0, then S satisﬁes
these properties for every execution in C.
Proof. Let E ∼s E ′, and let S′ =
{
β ∈ S|S is G(Dec3(E , S, β))-consistent
}
.
First we show that S′ ∩ correct(E ′) /= ∅. Observe that S′ ⊆ V(G2(E)), because if some β ∈ S′ were not in V(G2(E)), this
would imply that at the end of round 2 in E all the correct processors do not have β in their compatibility graphs. According
to Theorem 4, Dec3(E , S, β) = ⊥, which implies β ∈ S′.
Now, assume by contradiction that S′ ∩ correct(E ′) = ∅. Since correct(E ′) ⊆ V(G2(E)) (as follows from Property 4.4),
it follows that
∣∣∣V(G2(E))∣∣∣ ≥ ∣∣S′∣∣+ ∣∣correct(E ′)∣∣. For k > 1 this implies that 3f + 1 + k ≥ 2(f − k) + 1 + (2f + 1), which
holds if and only if k ≥ (f + 1)/3. However, this implies that C belongs to category I, which is a contradiction. For k = 1 we
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get (2f − 2) + (2f + 1) ≤ 3f + 2, which holds if and only if f ≤ 3. This is a contradiction, because by Lemma 4.5, for f ≤ 3
any f -graph is of size at most 3f + 1.
Since S′ ∩ correct(E ′) /= ∅, S is consistent with the round 2 compatibility graph of some correct processor in E ′, which by
Lemma 4.2 implies
∣∣S ∩ correct(E ′)∣∣ > 2 |S| /3. This, together with (|S| − 1)/3 ≤ f − 2 implies |S \ correct(E ′)| ≤ f − 2,
and thus
{
Dec3(E ′, S, α)
}
α∈S are well deﬁned (recall Deﬁnition 4.5).
The set S contains at least f + 1 processors that are correct in E . Thus there must exist α0 ∈ correct(E) ∩ correct(E ′) ∩ S
whose view in E and E ′ is the same. It follows that the compatibility graphs on which the agreement is reached remain
unchanged, i.e., ∀α ∈ S Dec3(E ′, S, α) = Dec3(E , S, α). 
Corollary 5.6. An equivalence class C of category II cannot contain a {0, 1}-connected execution.
Proof. Similar to that of Corollary 5.3. 
5.3. Category III
Lemma 5.7. For any execution E such that |V(G2(E))| ≤ 3f + 1 and G2(E) (the complement of G2(E)) contains a matching M
of order max
{
0,
∣∣∣V(G2(E))∣∣∣− (3f − 1)} , there exists a set S of identiﬁers with the following properties:
(i) 3(f − 1) ≤ |S| ≤ 3f − 1.
(ii) |S ∩ correct(E)| > 2 |S| /3.
(iii) |S \ correct(E)| ≤ f − 2.
(iv) For S′ =
{
α ∈ S
∣∣∣∀U ⊂ S s.t. |U| = (f − 1), U hits every (2f + 1)-clique in G(Dec3(E , S, α)) /= ⊥} it holds that∣∣S′∣∣>2|S|/3.
Proof. Let S be the set V(G2(E)) \ M. In case
∣∣∣V(G2(E))∣∣∣ ≤ 3f − 1, S is deﬁned to contain all of V(G2(E)) and possibly some
dummy identities, to get |S| = 3f − 1.
Since correct(E) form an independent set in G2(E), it can be easily veriﬁed that (i)–(iii) hold. From (ii) and (iii) it also
follows that
{
Dec3(E , S, α)
}
α∈S are well deﬁned (see Deﬁnition 4.5). Next, observe that any U ⊂ S of size f − 1 intersects
every independent set of size 2f + 1 in G2(E), or equivalently U hits every (2f + 1)-clique in G2(E). Since for every
α ∈ correct(E) G(Dec3(E , S, α)) is a subgraph of G2(E), it follows that correct(E) ∩ S = correct(E) \ M ⊆ S′. Furthermore,
|correct(E) \ M| > 2|S|/3. 
Lemma 5.8. Let C be an equivalence class of executions, belonging to category III. If there exists a set S that satisﬁes the properties
(i)-(iv) in Lemma 5.7 for some E ∈ C, then S satisﬁes these properties for every execution in C.
Proof. Let E , E ′ be two strongly similar executions in C and suppose that the properties hold for E .
First observe that S′ ⊆ V(G2(E)), because if some β ∈ S′ were not in V(G2(E)), it would imply that at the end of round 2
in E all the correct processors do not have β in their compatibility graphs, in which case Dec3(E , S, β) = ⊥ (see Theorem 4).
Next we show that S′ ∩ correct(E ′) /= ∅. Suppose the opposite. |S′| > 2|S|/3 > 2(f − 1) implies that |S′| ≥ f + 1. From
correct(E ′) ⊆ V(G2(E)) it follows that G2(E) contains at least (f + 1) + (2f + 1) = 3f + 2 vertices, which contradicts the
assumption on C.
Let α0 ∈ S′ ∩ correct(E ′). Each subset of size f − 1 of S intersects every (2f + 1)-clique in G(Dec3(E ′, S, α0)), and thus
in particular the correct(E ′) clique. Therefore, |S \ correct(E ′)| ≤ f − 2, which implies |S ∩ correct(E ′)| > 2|S|/3, so that{
Dec3(E ′, S, α)
}
α∈S are well deﬁned.
Properties (i) and (ii) of Lemma 5.7 imply in particular that the set S contains at least f + 1 correct processors. Thus there
must exist a processor in correct(E) ∩ correct(E ′) ∩ S whose view in E and E ′ is the same. It follows that the decisions remain
unchanged, i.e., ∀α ∈ S Dec3(E ′, S, α) = Dec3(E , S, α). 
Corollary 5.9. An equivalence class C of category III cannot contain a {0, 1}-connected execution.
Proof. Similar to that of Corollary 5.3. 
5.4. Category IV
Category IV includes equivalence classes C that contain only executions whoseG2 graph is of order at most 3f + 1. Also, for
every E ∈ C the complement of G2(E) does not contain a matching of order max
{
0,
∣∣∣V(G2(E))∣∣∣− (3f − 1)}, since otherwise
C would have belonged to category III. These equivalence classes of executions are somewhat similar to model M1 and the
similarity-invariant property is the same one used in Section 3. For executions that belong to an equivalence class in category
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IV we redeﬁne the notion of execution consistent sets (cf. Deﬁnition 3.1), whose role will be similar to that of graph consistent
sets in the previous categories.
Deﬁnition 5.2. A set S of ids of size 3f + 1 is consistent with an execution E if and only if correct(E ′) ⊂ S for every E ′ ∼ E .
Note that Dec(E , S) (see Deﬁnition 2.13) is well deﬁned whenever S is E-consistent. Our goal in this section is to show that
for any class C in category IV, if there exist E0 ∈ C and an E0-consistent set S0 such that Dec(E0, S0) = 0, then for any E ∈ C
there exists an E-consistent set S for which Dec(E , S) = 0.
Lemma 5.10. Let C be an equivalence class of executions, belonging to category IV, and E ∈ C. Suppose that Dec(E , S) = 0, and
that β ∈ S. If there are at least f + 1 correct processors α1, . . ., αf+1 in E such that β /∈ V(G(T1(E , αi))), where f + 1 ≥ i ≥ 1,
then for any β ′ /∈ S Dec(E , {β ′} ∪ S \ {β})= 0.
Proof. Similar to the proof of Lemma 3.1 in Section 3. 
Lemma 5.11. Let C be an equivalence class of executions, belonging to category IV, and E ∈ C. Suppose that Dec(E , S) = 0 and
that α ∈ V(G2(E)) \ S. Then there exists β ∈ S \ V(G2(E)), such that Dec(E , {α} ∪ S \ {β}) = 0.
Proof. We consider separately the two different possible sizes of G2(E).
(i) Suppose that |V(G2(E))| = 3f + 1, and let β ∈ S \ V(G2(E)). If there are f + 1 correct processors whose G1 compat-
ibility graph does not include β , then by Lemma 5.10, Dec(E , {α} ∪ S \ {β}) = 0. Otherwise, there are at least f + 1 correct
processors that receive a message from β in round 1, which implies that G2(E) contains at least f + 1 edges. Therefore,
either G2(E) contains a 2-matching or a vertex that does not belong to a (2f + 1)-independent set. Both cases contradict the
assumptions.
(ii) Suppose that |V(G2(E))| = 3f , and letβ1, β2 ∈ S \ V(G2(E)). If bothβ1, β2 appear inG1 graphs of at least f + 1 correct
processors, then there exists a correct processor γ whose G1 compatibility graph contains β1 and β2. It follows that γ has a
positive degree in G2(E), which contradicts the assumption that G2(E) has no edges. Therefore, w.l.o.g one can assume that
β1 appears in G
1 graphs of at most f correct processors. By Lemma 5.10, Dec(E , {α} ∪ S \ {β1}) = 0. 
Lemma 5.12. Let E1 and E2 be two similar executions. If Dec(E1, S1) = 0, where S1 is E1-consistent, then there exists an E2-
consistent set S2, such that Dec(E2, S2) = 0.
Proof. Observe that since correct(E2) ⊂ S1, Dec(E2, S1) is well deﬁned and is equal to 0. If S1 is E2-consistent we are done.
Otherwise, there exists an execution E ′2 that is similar to E2, and α ∈ correct(E ′2) \ S1. Since α ∈ V(G2(E2)), according to
Lemma 5.11 it can be inserted into S1 instead of some other id that does not appear in G
2(E2), without changing the decision
value. This procedure is repeated until the modiﬁed set becomes E2-consistent. 
Corollary 5.13. An equivalence class C of category IV cannot contain a {0, 1}-connected execution.
Proof. Suppose the contrary. Let E0 ∈ C be an execution in which the inputs of all the correct processors are 0, and let E1 ∈ C
be an execution in which the inputs of all the correct processors are 1. From Lemma 5.12 it follows that there exists a set S
which is consistent with E1, such that Dec(E1, S) = 0. This is a contradiction, since more than 2/3 of S are correct processors
with input 1. 
This completes the proof of the upper bound:
Theorem 5. In model M2, an (f + 1)-round execution of the full-information protocol in which the input of all the correct
processors is 0 cannot be similarity connected to an execution in which the input of all the correct processors is 1.
As in the case of model M1, if the namespace to which the ids of the processors belong is ﬁnite and known a priori,
Theorem 5 proves that consensus in M2 can be solved in f + 1 rounds. The next section shows how to solve consensus in
the case of an a priori unknown or inﬁnite original namespace.
6. Extension of the upper bound to an inﬁnite namespace
In Sections 3 and 5, we have shown that the complex of all (f + 1)-round executions does not contain {0,1}-connected
executions, for modelsM1 andM2, respectively. When the ids of the processors are from a ﬁxed ﬁnite namespace (which can
be arbitrarily large), this result is sufﬁcient to solve the consensus task. More speciﬁcally, as was already discussed in Section
3, each processor can compute the complex and determine if its round f + 1 view belongs to any 0-connected execution or
not. In the former case it decides 0, otherwise it decides 1.
Here, we show how this result is extended to solve the BA problem in f + 1 rounds in the case of an a priori unknown or
inﬁnite identiﬁer namespace. The main idea is that the ﬁnite complexes can be used to make the decision even in these cases.
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Deﬁnition 6.1. For a set of ids S, where ∞ > |S| ≥ 3f + 1, let F(S) denote the complex of (f + 1)-round executions of the
full-information protocol in a system with n = 3f + 1 processors, f of which may be faulty, where the ids of all the processors
are known to belongs to S.
In the present work F(S) is a graph (we do not consider its higher dimensions), where every feasible execution is a vertex
and two vertices are connected by an edge if and only if the corresponding executions are similar.
Deﬁnition 6.2. For any two sets of ids of equal size, S1 and S2, and any bijection π : S1 → S2, π̂ denotes the (graph)
isomorphism π̂ : F(S1) → F(S2) deﬁned as follows. For any E ∈ F(S1), π̂(E) is the execution accepted by replacing in
the description of E (see Section 2.1) all the occurrences of every id α ∈ S1 by the id π(α) ∈ S2.
We use the following notations. Let N denote the maximum number of distinct ids that a correct processor can observe in
an execution (both directly and indirectly, in the messages it receives during the f + 1 rounds). For a correct processor α, let
S(α) denote the set of all the ids observed by α. It holds that |S(α)| ≤ N. Let D(α) be a set of dummy ids of size nN − |S(α)|.
We assume that the dummy ids of every correct processor are distinct.
The following theorem presents a procedure for solving BA, which does not rely on a ﬁxed id namespace.
Theorem 6. The BA problem in models M1 andM2 can be solved if every correct processor performs the following steps.
(i) Let T denote the view of correct processor α at the end of round f + 1, constructed by the full-information protocol.
(ii) The processor α constructs the (ﬁnite) complex F(S(α) ∪ D(α)).
(iii) In this complex α ﬁnds an execution E such that T = Tf+1(E , α).
(iv) If E in F(S(α) ∪ D(α)) is 0-connected, then α decides 0, otherwise α decides 1.
Proof. Let E denote the execution that actually occurred. Let S = ⋃α∈correct(E) S(α). It follows that |S| ≤ nN. Let D be a set
of dummy ids of size nN − |S|.
For any correct processor α deﬁne a bijection π : S ∪ D → S(α) ∪ D(α) as follows. π is identity on (S ∪ D)⋂(S(α) ∪
D(α)), i.e., any id which belongs both to S ∪ D and S(α) ∪ D(α) corresponds to oneself, while for the rest of the ids π is
deﬁned arbitrarily. Recall that π is automatically extended to an isomorphism π̂ : F(S ∪ D) → F(S(α) ∪ D(α)).
By deﬁnition, the execution E appears in F(S ∪ D). Since π̂ is a graph isomorphism, it follows that E in F(S ∪ D) is
0-connected if and only if π̂(E) is 0-connected in F(S(α) ∪ D(α)). The key point is that the difference between E and π̂(E)
is only in ids that α never observed, i.e., only in messages to correct processors other than α, sent in round f + 1. Therefore,
T = Tf+1(E , α) = Tf+1(π̂(E), α).
Now, suppose that E in F(S ∪ D) is 0-connected. Then π̂(E) is 0-connected in F(S(α) ∪ D(α)), and since the view of α
in E (the execution that α has chosen in step (iii)) and in π̂(E) is the same, it follows that E ∼ π̂(E). That is, E is 0-connected
as well. Thus α decides 0.
On the other hand, suppose that α decides 0, i.e., E is 0-connected. Then π̂(E) is also 0-connected, which implies that E
in F(S ∪ D) is 0-connected. The latter shows, as we have just argued, that all the correct processors decide 0. This ﬁnishes
the proof of the agreement property.
To show validity, observe that when the input of all the correct processors is 1, E in F(S ∪ D) cannot be 0-connected,
otherwise F(S ∪ D) contains a {0,1}-connected execution, which was shown to be impossible (the main result of this paper).
No correct processor decides 0, since this was shown to imply that E in F(S ∪ D) is 0-connected. When the input of all
the correct processors is 0, E in F(S ∪ D) is (obviously) 0-connected. As was shown above, this implies that all the correct
processors decide 0. 
7. A 3-round lower bound for the general case
This section shows that when there are no restrictions on the id that a faulty processor can include in its message, f + 1
rounds might not be sufﬁcient for solving BA. This is formally stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 7. In modelM3, for a system of any size n, consensus cannot be solved in 2 rounds in the presence of a single failure. In
particular, the claim is true for an a priori ﬁxed, ﬁnite id namespace of size n.
From the above, it is clear that 2 rounds are insufﬁcient not because the identities are unknown, but rather because of
the ability of the faulty processor to fake the identities of correct processors. We note that this “identity theft” ability has an
impact on other distributed coordination problems [25].
The proof of Theorem 7 relies on a chain argument (e.g., see Section 4.1 in Ref. [16]). We describe a sequence of similar
2-round executions that starts from an execution in which the input of all the correct processors is 0 and ends with an
execution in which the input of all the correct processors is 1. Intuitively, 2 rounds are insufﬁcient because the similarity and
the strong similarity relations are not equivalent in M3, i.e., two similar executions may not belong to the same equivalence
class under the ≈s relation. Since the proof in Section 5 uses the fact that any two similar executions are strongly similarity
connected, the above observation explains where the proof fails if we try to apply it to M3.
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To simplify the presentation of the similarity chain, we regard the 0/1 input values as part of the processor id. The
similarity chain will connect two executions with disjoint sets of ids of the correct processors, which also implies that the
input values of all the correct processors can be switched.
In the previous sections, it was possible to disregard the link numbers, since these sections dealt with an upper bound
(as was already noted in Section 2.1). For a lower bound, the fact that information on communication port numbers is also
included in the messages of the full-information protocol, cannot be disregarded. In particular, it is important to note that a
ﬁrst round message carries the port through which it is sent, in addition to the sender’s id (i.e., it is no longer the case that a
correct processor sends exactly the same message to all the processors). Below, it is assumed that the ﬁrst round messages
of all the executions satisfy the following two properties:
(i) Suppose that a correct processor α receives a message from a correct processor β , and that this message was sent
via communication port l of β . If the faulty processor sends a message to α with the id β , then this message must contain
port l as its outgoing communication port (of course the actual port of the faulty processor through which it is sent can be
arbitrary).
(ii) Two distinct correct processors α1,α2 cannot receive a ﬁrst round message with the same source id and the same
outgoing communication port number.
In the sequel, we do not refer explicitly to the above two properties, however it can be veriﬁed that every execution below
satisﬁes both conditions.
Lemma 7.1. Any two (2-round) executions E and E ′, which differ only in round 2 messages sent by the faulty processor, are
similarity connected.
Proof.Suppose that the round 2 message thatα ∈ correct(E) = correct(E ′) receives from the faulty processor differs between
E and E ′. Consider an execution which is the same as E , except that α receives the same round 2 message as in E ′. This
execution is indistinguishable from E for any correct processor other than α. By modifying the round 2 messages for one
correct processors at a time, as just described, we construct a similarity chain between E and E ′. 
Deﬁnition 7.1. A 2-round execution E (which satisﬁes the above (i) and (ii) conditions) is called an [(α1, β1), . . . , (αn, βn)]-
execution if correct(E) = {α1, . . ., αn} and the id contained in the message which αi received from the faulty processor in
the ﬁrst round is βi.
Note that an [(α1, β1), . . . , (αn, βn)]-execution is not unique—there are several such executions, which differ in their
round 2 messages and their communication port labeling schemes.
Lemma 7.2. Let E0 be an [(α1, β1), . . ., (αn, βn)]-execution, where βi = αj. Then there exists an [(α1, β1), . . . ,(αj−1, βj−1),
(αj , β
′
j ), (αj+1, βj+1), . . . ,(αn, βn)]-execution E1, such that E0 ≈ E1.
Proof. In E0 the processor αi sees two processors that claim to have αj identiﬁer, one of which is correct and the other is
faulty. According to Lemma 7.1, E0 is similarity connected to an execution E , in which the round 2 message that αi receives
from the faulty processor is the same as the one from the correct αj , except that the faulty processor claims to observe β
′
j
via the channel on which the correct αj sees βj . Finally, observe that E is similar to an execution in which it is the correct αj
which receives a round 1 message with the id β ′j , while the faulty processor sends to αi the messages that in E it received
from the correct αj . This last execution is the required E1. We note that αi is the only processor whose view is the same in E
and E1. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the proof of Lemma 7.2. The letters represent the processor ids and the numbers are the link labels.
The ﬁgure shows a transition in which the message that processor A receives from the faulty processor in the ﬁrst round is
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Fig. 2. The two similar executions in the last step of the proof of Lemma 7.2, for n = 5.
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Fig. 3. The similarity chain from the proof of Lemma 7.4, for n = 5.
modiﬁed. The correct processors appear in the central square, the views in the messages of the faulty processor are depicted
around it. Processor D (shaded) preserves its view in the depicted transformation. As noted in its proof, Lemma 7.2 is the
point where the difference between models M2 and M3 is required, both in the statement of the lemma (an execution with
βi = αj is impossible in M2) and in the proof.
Lemma 7.3. Let E0 be an [(α1, β), (α2, β), . . ., (αj−1, β), (αj , β ′), (αj+1, β), . . ., (αn, β)]-execution. There exists an [(α1, αj),
(α2, αj), . . ., (αj−1, αj), (β , β ′′), (αj+1, αj), . . ., (αn, αj)]-execution E1, such that E0 ≈ E1.
Proof. The round 2 messages from the faulty processor in E0 can be gradually changed to the ones it would have sent if it
were a correct processor with id β in an execution where the faulty processor, whose real id is αj , presents itself as β
′′. When
this modiﬁcation is ﬁnished, we can just reverse the roles of αj and β (since both act as correct, except for contradicting each
other). The resulting execution is E1  .
From the above lemmas it follows:
Lemma 7.4. Let E0 be an [(α1, α2), (α2, α3), . . ., (αj−2, αj−1), (αj−1, αj), (αj , αj+1), . . ., (αn−1, αn), (αn, α1)]-execution. Then
there exists an [(α1, α2), (α2, α3), . . ., (αj−1, γ ), (γ , αj+1), (αj+1, αj+2), . . ., (αn−1, αn), (αn, α1)]-execution E1, such that
E0 ≈ E1.
Proof. Lemma 7.2 implies that E0 is similarity connected to an [(α1, α2), (α2, α3), . . . , (αj−2, αj−1), (αj−1, γ ), (αj , αj+1),
. . . , (αn−1, αn), (αn, α1)]-execution, which in turn is similarity connected to [(α1, α2), (α2, α3), . . . , (αj−2, γ ), (αj−1, γ ),
(αj , αj+1), . . . , (αn−1, αn), (αn, α1)]-execution. Similar applications of Lemma 7.2 imply that E0 is similarity connected
to an [(α1, γ ), (α2, γ ), . . . , (αj−2, γ ), (αj−1, γ ), (αj , αj+1), (αj+1, γ ), . . . , (αn−1, γ ), (αn, γ )]-execution. By Lemma 7.3,
this execution is in turn similarity connected to an [(α1, αj), (α2, αj), . . . , (αj−1, αj), (γ , αj+1), (αj+1, αj), . . . , (αn−1, αj),
(αn, αj)]-execution. Next, we apply Lemma 7.2, to get a similarity connected [(α1, αj), (α2, αj), . . . , (αj−1, αj), (γ , αj+1),
(αj+1, αj+2), . . . , (αn−1, αj), (αn, αj)]-execution. As before, we consecutively apply Lemma 7.2, to construct a similarity
connected [(α1, α2), (α2, α3), . . . , (αj−1, γ ), (γ , αj+1), (αj+1, αj+2), . . . , (αn−1, αn), (αn, α1)]-execution. 
Fig. 3 illustrates the proof of Lemma 7.4 for n = 5. In the presented similarity chain, the id of a single correct processor
is replaced (B is changed to E). The ﬁgure shows only the ﬁrst round messages from the faulty processors, since according
to Lemma 7.1 round 2 messages have no effect on the similarity connectedness. In each step there is at least one correct
processor (shaded) whose view remains unchanged.
Proof of Theorem 7. Observe that n consecutive applications of Lemma 7.4, each time for a different αi, allow to replace all
the original identiﬁers by new ones. 
8. Conclusions
This paper considered the problem of BA in a fully connected network, when each processor starts without any a priori
knowledge of the network topology or the identiﬁers of the other processors. The main result of the paper is that under
the assumption of no “identity thefts”, f + 1 rounds are sufﬁcient for reaching agreement. The proof that was presented
is non-constructive. It uses several new techniques, such as compatibility graphs for representing the knowledge available
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to the processors, and similarity-invariant properties for reasoning about which executions can be similarity connected. In
addition, it was shown that in the general case, when faulty processors may use the ids of correct processors, f + 1 rounds
are not sufﬁcient for BA.
There are several questions regarding the round complexity of BA that remained unanswered. The ﬁrst one is to ﬁnd a
sufﬁciently good upper bound (or even the exact number of rounds) for BA in the anonymous model [24,26], in which the
processors have no identiﬁers at all. An additional possible research direction is to study the round complexity of the k-set
consensus task in the models presented in this work.
In the beginning of Section 4 we intuitively explained the problems faced by any attempt to generalize the standard EIG
algorithms to work in model M2. Whether a simple, explicit (f + 1)-round BA algorithm for M2 does exist, despite the
additional difﬁculties introduced by the model, is left as an open problem.
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